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IN 11-'.E SUPREME COURT OF THC: STATE OF UT/·.H 
CRAIG tli::CHAM and ) 
JOHN llt:DMAN, ) 
) Case No. 
Plaintiffs Appellants, ) 
) 15649 
VS •. ) 
) 
MYIWN L. BENSON and ) 
ELLEN BEHSON, ) 
) 
Defendants - Respondents. ) 
BRH.F OF PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants brought an action against Respondents to recover 
moneys paid as guarantors of respondents note with bank a~d to 
recover costs of repossession of a mobile home. Respondents counter-
claimed for damages alleging fraud. 
DISPOSITIOH" IN LOWER COURT 
The- case was tried to a jury upon a general verdict. The jury 
found for defendants - respondents and against plaintiffs - appellants 
and awarded respondents damages. 
RELit:F SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the jury verdict dismissed as tu them-
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selves or in the alternative for a new trial on issues in error. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants were owners of a corpuration, Majestic Homes, Inc. 
{T-.J) 
whose business was the sale of mobile homes ·Ii Respondents approa•:; 
appellants and inquired about the purchase of certain homes. ApptJ 
ants showed respondents a certain mobile home that had been used 
{_,-...,,) 
for some time as a demonstrator modelAand were told thex could 
(r.1~.1.3) 
purchase the home at a discount because of its prior use./.. Respcn· 
(J.1;(,1,,'11) (T-113,fC'?-7.17) ' 
dents inspected the home ,}i noted certain defects11 and agreed to pur-
chase the home for a price below the normal price for that type 
(-r. 1l) 
mobile home .A 
Respondents moved into the home and lived there for about 9 
months when they ceased to make payments on their loan and then 
( 1-10:.) 
moved from the home without notice to appellants.A Appellants 
attempted to contact the respondents to obtain payments, but rwJ 
no response to their inquiries. Appellants had ceased doing bus~:, 
as Majestic Homes, Inc., but rP-mained secondarily liable on Res-
pondents' note to the bank, and maintained by virtue thereof a 
I 
security interest in the home. Accordingly, appellants made res· 
pendents payments to the bank ansf. then after notice tc responder.:' 
(T-~'1') 
resold the abandoned mobile home.A 
Appellants then commenced legal proceedings to recover the I 
payments made on their behalf and to recover costs of repassessi::j 
I 
Appellants alsc sought to recover the deficiency between the ~~ 
price and the loan balance which was also paid to the bank by 
appellants. 
-2-
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ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR THE 
CU.IM BROIJGFT AGAINST T!!EM AS AGENTS 
OF MAJESTIC H011ES, INC. 
At the trial no evidence: was introduced to show that the 
appellants were the alter ego of the corporation from whom they 
purchased the mobile home. There was no introduction of evidence 
to show identity cf interests or disregard of the corporate entity 
by the appellants. {_--r,:'/-'f-'11) 
Appellants sued respondent::; as individuals for moneys expended, 
but did not thereby consent to personal liability for their prior 
acts as agents of the corporation. 
~· /1 'fi7 
Absent a finding that there had been a disregard of the corporat, 
entity the appellants as officers and directors could only be liable \ 
in contract if they had signed the contracts personally. llowever, 
all documents were signed by appellants on behalf of the corporation. 
(TR. 'f'f-'11) Although the respondents' pleadings alleged fraud by the 
appellants the~e was no proof of fraud nor finding of frau<l by the (:rn I JS, In; 
Court.~This court has found in Tintic Indian Chief Mining and 
Milling Co v. Clyde, 79 Utah 337, 10 P. 2d 932 ( that it is 
necessary to allege and prove actual fraud showing that the director~ 
or stockholders did not act in geed faith. 
These normal protections to officers and directors Df corpora-
tions are 2xtended and corporate existence is continued for this 
purpose beyond the time of dissolution of the corporation. 
-3-~~~----------------... 
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The corporate entity is continued by Utah Code Annotated Sectior 
16-10-100 and 16-10-101 ( 1953) as amended. These sections expr' 
ly provide that an action properly brought against the corporati 
may be defended in the corporate name after the corporations dis· 
solution. 
The record shows that there was no fraud by the appellants, ( -r~. I).. S:- I ;J.. 7) 
alleged.f1 The respondents testified at trial and in their affida.1 
that they knew the mobile home had been usedy and were told it 
(T/f. &f7, lbt.- Jc¥) 
was used by the appellant Craig Mecham. /I Respondents also inspec:1 
(-rR11?>) 
the home and were aware of certain needed repairs ;/)they bought t· 
home with knowledge that it was sold for a lower price because: 
(/Tf. '""';) 
its prior use./) Respondents failed to show that the appellants c. 
either of them knowingly and with intent to mislead the respondei 
failed to reveal ali material facts known to them to the respond! 
(f"R. . .Z ~-3,, </-01 S't/, ?'ii") 
Although respondents witness testified that a mobile home 
was blown over prior to sale there was no proof that it was in: 
the respondents mobile home nor that the appellant had any know: 
( '17f. . 'f I - p-) 
that it had blown over. ;1 The witness testifying that one had blc ~.f'f) 
over also testified that it was not damaged to any degree .A The: 
fore, even if it had been shown that the respondents trailer hac 
blown over it would not follow that appellant would have known·· 
that the fact would have been material to the respondents had t'.' 
known. 
The law has always required proof of fraud by clear and cc: 
ing evidence that there was a material mis-representation and~ 
h d · their detr:·t t e respon ents relied on the mis-representation to 
Obeg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P 2d 229 (1947), 234; ~ 
v. Lauritzen, 424 P2d 136, 18 Utah 2d 386 (1967). Sponso ed by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The evidence shows that the appellant Craig Mecham acted in 
total good faith revealing all the defects of which he was aware 
and offering complete opportunity to inspect and reject the trailer 
if unsatisfied. Respondents have not proved that they were damaged. 
At most they have shown mutual mistake which is insufficient to in-
voke personal liability. Respondents had the burden.of proving that 
there was a material mis-representation upon which they relied and 
which caused pecuniary damage and that respondents wculd have 
acted differently had the mis-representation not been made. Res-
show 
pendents failed in their proof to ~ these elements by clear and 
convincing evidence. There was no proof of loss of benefit of the 
bargain or of the difference between the actual value and value re-
presented. Accordingly respondents failed to meet their burden of 
proof. Obeg v. Sanders, 111 Utah 507~ 184 P2d 229 (1947), 234; 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P2d 273, (1952). 
It was also error to permit the jury to consider the issue of) {e1s "Tc3v<.sTeJ ~.131 
liability for fraud without requiring specific interrogatories~as 
to whether the jury in fact found intentional mis-representations 
and that such mis-representations were material and were relied 
on by the respondents for their damage. Failure to provide specific 
interrogatories resulted in the usurpation of the questions of equit 
from the judge by the jury. 
II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW RESPONDENTS' 
COUHTERCLAIM WAS BARRED BY 
THE CONTRACTS' EXPRESS PROVISIONS 
AND BY RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO 
GIVE NOTICE OF REJECTION 
-5-
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A 
Respondents contend that the contract was partially filled 
in out of their presence. It was disputed at trial whether the 
terms of finance charge and percentage rate were in fact filled 
in at the time of signing. As.suming the jury determined this 
issue in favor of respondents it is nevertheless clear that the. 
parties had agreed on thes~ terms of the contract and that if it 
was not filled in at: signing it was later filled in in accordanc, 
with the understanding of the parties. &-t?.1l., ~1:5'2.., 1'1- ~>) 
In any event the parties did review, sign and receive am 
(/P...1'f) 
of the Installment Sale and Security Agreement/Jand ccnformed th< 
action to the terms thereof for about 8 months.("f~.Yo) 
In its releveant parts the Agreement provides: 
"This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement 
of the parties and may not be altered or amended 
except by written agreement of the parties." 
In addition, under Seller's Warranties in bold face type the Agr' 
ment provides: 
"Seller makes ..• no warranties express or implied 
respecting the property sold except title, and 
expressly excludes any implied warranties of 
merchantability or fitness." 
The parties also signed as part cf the agreement to purchase th' 
home the Mobile Home Purchase Agreement and Down Payment Receif'. 
On this document in handwritten additions the appellants clearl_ 
wrote "as is" on each item regarding the mobile home, its exter: 
and interior and its contents. 
This reflects the facts which the 
frR.1~, ,7) 
that they inspected the home~and noted 
-6-
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Cn.11~1r) 
were aware of the prior use of the mobile home;~and that they 
were aware of their obtaining a discounted price because of the 
{TR.. l-1.13) 
prior use and needed repairs.A Additional repairs were requested 
and admitted at trial to have been made by the appellants.(rn.11l') 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code (U.U.C.C.) is applicable to 
this matter since it involves the sale of goods. Section 70A-2-316 
U .U .C.C. subsections (2} and (J} provide: 
(2) Subject: t:o subsection (3) > to exclude or 
modify the implied warranty of merchantability 
or any part: of it the language must mention 
merchantability and in case of a writing, must 
be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any 
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a 
writing and conspicuous .•• 
( 3) Notwithstanding subsection ( 2) (a) unless 
the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied 
warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", ••• 
Thus the acts of the appellants fully complied with the statu-
tory provisions for exclusion of warranty. In light of the particu-
lar nature of the sale of a priorly used item after full inspection, 
it was error for the court to allow the jury to decide respondents 
counterclaim since the verdict was contrary to the privisions of the 
Utah Commercial Code providing for the protection of seller's of 
merchandise. 
In Tibbits v. Openshaw 18 Utah Zd 442, 425 P2d (1967), this 
Court enforced the "as is" language with regard to a sale of land. 
The legislative mandate is much clearer in this case, and the parties 
exclusion of warranties is as extensive and clear. 
B. 
Secondly, the respondent failed to give reasonable notice of 
-7-
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rejection or otherwise inform the appellants of any reason for 
dissatisfaction as required by Utah Commercial Code, Section 70; 
2-606(1) U.C.A. states: 
Acceptance of the goods occurs when the buyer (a) 
after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the 
goods signifies to the seller that the goods are 
conforming or that he will accept them in spite 
of their non conformity, or (b) fails to make 
effective rejection ••• but such acceptance does 
not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable 
opportunity to inspect them; ••• 
Section 70A-Z-607{J) sets forth t:he effect of an acceptanc: 
Where tender ha& been accepted (a) the buyer must 
within a reasonable time after he discovers or 
should have discovered any breach notify the 
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy; 
In this case respondents each failed to make an effective :I 
jection of the mobile home. After inspecting the home and finci:J 
(-n,.J ot.
1 
) O(·~ 
some alleged defects the buyers accepted it nevertheless ·1' Appe.1 
were under no obligation to take responsibility for any defects 
since the terms of the two written agreements as well as the 
understanding of the parties was that all warranties were waive. 
However, appellants did undertake to make some repairs when re· 
quested. Respondents however continued to indicate that they 
accepted the mobile home and failed to notify of any rejection. 
Rather, they ceased making payments, moved out, and refused to 
respond to respondents' demands for payment or explanation for' 
lack of any. Not until almost two years later and 6 months af: 
appellants had commenced suit did the respondents set forth the 
alleged defects and counterclaim of rejection. This is not nc: 1 
within a reasonable time and therefore respondents should ~~ 
barred as a matter of law from any remedy. 
-8-
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This case is controlled on this point by the almost identical 
case of Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burns, 527 p 2d 655 (Utah, 1974) 
where this Court held that the failure to object for two years 
where there were express waivers of warranty precluded the buyer of 
a mobile home from raising the defense of latent defects as a 
defense to sellers suit for payment. See also, Knudsen Music Co. 
v. Masterson, 121, Utah 252~ 240 P 2d 973 (1952). 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law the respondents failed to prove the elements 
of fraud. By so doing they can not properly invoke the personal 
liability of the appellants for their acts as agents of the seller 
corporation. In addition, the seller corporation properly and 
clearly excluded all warranties of merchantability and fitness in 
two separate documents and through the parties understanding. 
Respondents failed to give notice of their rejection of the mobile 
home and were thereby barred from raLsing the alleged defects as 
a defense to appellants suit for payment. 
Respectfully submitted this .?6~ day of ~ , 1978. 
I 
~J. _ r7 /Yr;.0_ 
CXtfj(g f c- ( !bU:Za 
STEVEN F. ALDER 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Appellants Brief was mailed to Respondents' attorney, Mark S. Miner, 
at 525 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Uc.-a-4111, this~ day 
., fV(rr . 1978. ~ l-r~ 
S'N!,.l.ilEN F. ALDER 
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